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ABSTRACT
Asbestos, a new prototype operating system, provides novel la-
beling and isolation mechanisms that help contain the effects
of exploitable software ﬂaws. Applications can express a wide
range of policieswithAsbestos’skernel-enforced label mechanism,
including controls on inter-process communication and system-
wide information ﬂow. A new event process abstraction provides
lightweight, isolated contexts within a single process, allowing the
same process to act on behalf of multiple users while preventing
it from leaking any single user’s data to any other user. A Web
server that uses Asbestos labels to isolate user data requires about
1.5 memory pages per user, demonstrating that additional security
can come at an acceptable cost.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: D.4.6 [Operating Sys-
tems]: Security and Protection—Information ﬂow controls, Access
controls; D.4.1 [Operating Systems]: Process Management; D.4.7
[Operating Systems]: Organization and Design; C.5.5[Computer
System Implementation]: Servers
General Terms: Security, Design, Performance
Keywords: labels, mandatory access control, information ﬂow,
event processes, secure Web servers
1 INTRODUCTION
Breaches of Web servers and other networked systems routinely
divulge private information on a massive scale [23, 32]. The kinds
of exploitable software ﬂawsthat enable these breaches willpersist,
but all is not lost if we design systems that limit the possible impact
of most exploits. A powerful tool to contain exploits isthe principle
of least privilege [37], which directs that each system component
should have the minimum privilege required to accomplish its task.
A corresponding policy would prevent a server acting for one prin-
cipal from accessing data belonging to another principal through
direct or indirect channels. A least privilege policy, enforced by the
operating system at the behest of a small, trusted part of the ap-
plication, would defang classes of exploits from SQL injection to
buffer overruns, making servers much safer in practice.
Unfortunately, current operating systems cannot enforce least
privilege. Eventhemuchweaker goal ofisolatingservicesfromone
another (without isolating principal state inside each service) re-
quires ﬁddly and error-prone abuse of primitives designed for other
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purposes [20]. Most servers instead revert to the most insecure de-
sign, monolithic code running withmany privileges. It should come
as no surprise that high-impact breaches continue.
New operating system primitives are needed [21], and the best
place to explore candidates is the unconstrained context of a new
OS. Hence the Asbestos operating system, which can enforce strict
application-deﬁned security policies even on efﬁcient, unprivileged
servers.
Asbestos’s contributions are twofold. First, all access control
checks use Asbestos labels, a primitive that combines advantages
of discretionary and nondiscretionary access control. Labels deter-
mine which services a process can invoke and with which other
processes it can interact. Like traditional discretionary capabilities,
they can be used to enumerate positive rights, such as the right to
send to the network. Unlike traditional capability systems, how-
ever, Asbestos labels can also track and limit the ﬂow of informa-
tion within system- and application-deﬁned compartments. These
complementary security models are linked by a key observation:
the ability to declassify data in a single compartment is analogous
to possession of a discretionary capability. The resulting system
supports capability-like and traditional MLS [9] policies, as well as
application-speciﬁc isolation policies with decentralized declassi-
ﬁcation, through a single uniﬁed mechanism.
Second, Asbestos’s event process abstraction lets server applica-
tions efﬁciently support and isolate many concurrent users. In con-
ventional label systems, server processes would quickly become
contaminated by data belonging to multiple users and lose the abil-
ity to respond to anyone. One ﬁx is a forked server model, in which
each active user has a forked copy of the server process; unfortu-
nately, this resource-heavy architecture burdens the OS with many
thousands of processes that need memory allocated and CPU time
scheduled. Event processes allow a single process to keep private
state for multiple users, but isolate that state so that an exploit af-
fects only one user’s data. A group of event processes is almost as
efﬁcient as a single ordinary process. The event process discipline
encourages efﬁcient server construction, and in our experiments,
servers cancache thousands of user sessions withlow storage costs.
Measurements on an x86 PC show that an Asbestos Web server
can support comprehensive user isolation at a cost of about 1.5
memory pages per user. Furthermore, although our prototype la-
bel implementation impacts performance, an Asbestos Web server
storing isolated data for thousands of users is in some ways com-
petitive with Apache on Unix. Asbestos shows that an OS can sup-
port ﬂexible, yet stringent, security policies, including information
ﬂow control, even within the challenging environment of a high-
performance Web server.
2 APPLICATION GOAL
We evaluated Asbestos by implementing a secure application that
we could not build on current systems, namely a dynamic-content
Web server that isolates user data. Our goal, in a nutshell:
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large-scale server applications whose application-
deﬁned users are isolated from one another by the oper-
ating system, according to application policy.
The rest of thissection expands and clariﬁesthisgoal. Although the
goal refers to server applications, Asbestos mechanisms should aid
in the construction of other types of software. For example, email
readers could use related policies to restrict the privileges of attach-
ments, reducing the damage inﬂicted by users who unwittingly run
disguised malicious code.
A large-scale server application responds to network requests
from a dynamically changing population of thousands or even hun-
dreds of thousands of users. A single piece of hardware may run
multiple separate or cooperating applications. Examples include
Web commerce and bulletin-board systems, as well as many pre-
Web client/server systems. Such applications achieve good perfor-
mance through aggressive caching, which minimizes stable storage
delays. By efﬁcient, then, we mean that an Asbestos server should
cache user data with low overhead. This would be simple if the
cache were trusted, but we additionally want to isolate different
users’ data from one another, so that any security breaches are con-
tained. The Asbestos event process mechanism aims to satisfy this
requirement.
By unprivileged, we mean that the system administrator has
granted the application theminimumprivilege required tocomplete
its job, and this minimum privilege is much less than all privilege.
Thus, the system follows the principle of least privilege.
Users are application-deﬁned, meaning each application can de-
ﬁne its own notion of principal and its own set of principals. One
application’s users can be distinct from another’s, or the user pop-
ulations can overlap. An application’s users may or may not corre-
spond to human beings and typically won’t correspond to the set of
human beings allowed to log in to the system’s console.
By isolated, we mean that a process acting for one user cannot
gain inappropriate access to other users’ data. Appropriate access
is deﬁned by an application policy: the application deﬁnes which of
itspartsshould beisolated, andhow. Thepolicy should alsosupport
ﬂexible sharing among users for data that need not be isolated. All
users must trust some parts of the application, such as the part that
assigns users to client connections; since bugs in this trusted code
can allow arbitrary inter-user exploits, we aim to minimize its size.
The application deﬁnes the isolation policy, but the operating
system enforces it. The OS should prevent even totally compro-
mised processes fromviolating thepolicy; for example, they should
be unable to launder data through non-compromised services and
applications. Thus, isolation policies can restrict information ﬂow
among processes that may be ignorant of the policies. Unfortu-
nately, any system that controls information ﬂow through run-time
checks can inappropriately divulge information when those checks
fail [31]; in effect, kernel data structures for tracking information
ﬂow provide a covert storage channel. We aim to eliminate storage
channels that can be exploited without multiple processes, so that a
later, hardened version of Asbestos can improve security by limit-
ing process creation rates. Section 8 discusses this issue in depth.
In summary, Asbestos must support a form of mandatory access
control, which transitively isolates processes by tracking and limit-
ing the ﬂow of information. Unprivileged applications deﬁne their
own isolation policies and decide what information need not be
isolated. Furthermore, OS mechanisms for labeling processes must
support highly concurrent server applications.
These Asbestos ideas achieve full expression in the design and
implementation of the Asbestos OK Web server, a much improved
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Figure 1: Processes of the Asbestos OK Web server. Grey boxes are
trusted. Worker processes contain one event process per user session.
version of the original OKWS for Unix [20]. The server imple-
ments a Web site with multiple dynamic workers—one each for
logging in, retrieving data, and changing a password, for exam-
ple. Each worker is its own process; the ok-demux process ana-
lyzes incoming connection requests and forwards them to the rel-
evant worker. Each worker caches relevant user data; caches for
different users are isolated from one another using labels and event
processes. A production system would additionally have a cache
shared by all workers, and Asbestos could without much trouble
support a shared cache that isolated users. We also implemented
SQL database access (table rows are labeled as belonging to partic-
ular users) and declassiﬁers (selected workers that can export user
data to the public). The workers are untrusted, meaning that worker
compromise cannot violate the user isolation policy. Trusted com-
ponents include the ok-demux process, the ok-dbproxy database in-
terface, and an idd process that checks user passwords, as well as
system components such as the network interface, IP stack, ﬁlesys-
tem, and kernel. Declassiﬁer workers are semi-trusted: a compro-
mised declassiﬁer can inappropriately leak the compromised user’s
data but cannot gain access to uncompromised users’ data. Figure 1
shows this server’s process architecture.
3 RELATED WORK
Mandatory access control (MAC) systems provide end-to-end en-
forcement of security policies by transitively following causal links
between processes. Operating systems have long expressed and en-
forced these policies using labels [9]. Labels assign each subject
and object a security level, which traditionally consists of a hier-
archical sensitivity classiﬁcation (such as unclassiﬁed, secret, top-
secret) and a set of categories (nuclear, crypto, and so forth). To
observe an object, a subject’s security level must dominate the ob-
ject’s. For example, a ﬁle with secret, nuclear data should only be
readable by processes whose clearance is at least secret and whose
category set includes nuclear. Security enhancement packages sup-
porting labels are available today for many popular operating sys-
tems including Linux [25] and FreeBSD [44].
MAC systems generally aspire to achieve some variant of the
∗-property [3]: whenever a process P can observe object O1 and
modify object O2, O2’s security level must dominate O1’s. In the
absence of the ∗-property, P could leak O1’s contents by writing
it to O2, leaving O1’s conﬁdentiality at P’s discretion rather than
mandatorily enforcing it. Of course, real operating systems do pro-
vide some way to declassify or “downgrade” data—for example,
as a special privilege afforded certain users if they press the secure
attention key [17]—but this lies outside the main security model.
Most MAC systems are geared towards military settings, which
require labels to specify at least 16 hierarchical sensitivity classi-
ﬁcations and 64 categories [9]. This label format determines what
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tions and categories must be centrally allocated and assigned by a
security administrator, preventing applications from crafting their
own policies with labels alone. Thus, MAC systems typically com-
bine labels witha separate discretionary access control mechanism;
ordinary Unix usersand groups might enforce accesscontrol within
the secret, nuclear level.
Asbestos labels differ signiﬁcantly from those of previous oper-
ating systems in that Asbestos lets any process dynamically create
label categories, or compartments. Moreover, a process can par-
tially bypass the ∗-property by declassifying information or rais-
ing the security clearance of other processes—but only with re-
spect to certain compartments, such as the ones it creates. Asbestos
tracks information ﬂow by dynamically adjusting labels, but a new
event process abstraction lets a single, unprivileged process sepa-
rately handle data from multiple compartments without accumulat-
ing restrictions. As described later, the Asbestos system call inter-
face provides a number of other novel features that facilitate the
use of labels, including temporary voluntary restrictions and split
send/receive labels with different defaults.
The idea of dynamically adjusting labels to track potential
information ﬂow dates back to the High-Water-Mark security
model [22] of the ADEPT-50 in the late 1960s. Numerous sys-
tems have incorporated such mechanisms, including IX [28] and
LOMAC [10]. The ORAC model [27] supported the idea of indi-
vidual originators placing accumulating restrictions on data, some-
what like creating compartments, except that data can still only be
declassiﬁed by users with the privileged Downgrader role.
Asbestos labels more closely resemble language-level ﬂow con-
trol mechanisms. Jif [31], in particular, was an inspiration for
Asbestos because of its support for decentralized declassiﬁcation
through separate ownership of different label components. Because
it is a programming language, Jif has the advantage of being able
to perform most of its label checks statically, at compile time. Run-
time checks can affect control ﬂow on failure, thereby creating im-
plicit information ﬂows [8]. However, compared to Asbestos, Jif
requires a centralized principal hierarchy and has no equivalent to
split label defaults, which Asbestos uses to support policies such as
preventing one process from talking to another.
Asbestos uses communication ports similar to those of previous
message-passing operating systems [6, 24, 30, 35, 36, 41], some of
which can conﬁne executable content [14], others of which have
had full-ﬂedged mandatory access control implementations [5].
Asbestos uses the same namespace—handles—for both ports and
compartments, allowing labels to emulate a wide range of security
mechanisms from discretionary capabilities to multi-level security.
In theory, capabilities alone sufﬁce to implement mandatory ac-
cess control. For instance, KeyKOS [18] achieved military-grade
security by isolating processes into compartments and interpos-
ing reference monitors to control use of capabilities across com-
partment boundaries. EROS [39] later successfully realized the
principles behind KeyKOS on modern hardware. Psychologically,
however, people have not accepted pure capability-based conﬁne-
ment [29], perhaps from fear that if just one inappropriate capabil-
ity escapes, the security of the whole system may be compromised.
As a result, a number of designs have combined capabilities with
authority checks [4], interposition [15], or even labels [16].
Mandatory access control can also be achieved with unmodiﬁed
traditional operating systemsthrough virtualmachines [11,17].For
example, the NetTop project [42] uses VMware for multi-level se-
curity. Virtual machines have two principal limitations, however:
performance [19, 46] and coarse granularity. One of the goals of
Asbestos is to allow ﬁne-grained information ﬂow control, so that
a single process can handle differently labeled data. To implement
a similar structure with virtual machines would require a separate
instance of the operating system for each label.
4 ASBESTOS OVERVIEW
Asbestos IPC resembles that of microkernels such as Mach. Pro-
cesses communicate using messages sent to ports. A process can
create arbitrarily many ports. Messages sent to a port are delivered
to the single process with receive rights for that port; thisis initially
the process that created the port, but receive rights are transferable.
The right to send to a port, however, is determined through label
checks, as described below.
Asbestos messaging is asynchronous and, unusually, unreliable:
the send system call might return a success value even if the mes-
sage cannot be delivered. There are several reasons for this. For
one, the kernel cannot tell whether a message is deliverable until
the instant that the receiving process tries to receive it, since in the
meantime the process’s labels can change to prevent delivery—or
to allow it. More seriously, given reliable delivery notiﬁcation, a
process could leak information using careful label changes, for ex-
ample causing successful delivery to correspond to 1 bits and un-
successful delivery to 0 bits. However, since only label checks (and
resource exhaustion) will cause messages to be dropped, careful
compartment management—such as our Web server’s—can make
delivery reliable in practice.
Conventional mechanisms such as pipes and ﬁle descriptors are
emulated using messages sent to ports; to read a ﬁle, for example,
the client sends a READ message to the ﬁleserver’sport and awaits
the corresponding READ R reply. The protocol messages were in-
spired by Plan 9’s 9P [34].
When asked to create a port, the kernel returns a new port with
an unpredictable name. This is necessary because the ability to cre-
ate a port with a speciﬁc name would be a covert channel. There-
fore, communication is generally bootstrapped using environment
variables that specify the port names services are currently using.
Asbestos contains system calls for allocating, remapping, and
freeing memory at particular virtual addresses, for creating and de-
stroying processes, for creating and dissociating ports, for sending
and receiving messages, for bootstrapping, and for debugging, in
addition to calls supporting label and event process functionality.
5 ASBESTOS LABELS
Asbestos labels support decentralized compartments that any pro-
cess can dynamically create and manipulate. In order to allow non-
privileged programs to craft their own MAC security schemes, As-
bestos labels combine both mandatory and discretionary access
controls. Asbestos gives a program that creates a new compart-
ment a discretionary right to declassify data in that compartment:
the program can give that right away, making the right similar to
a capability. The program will typically launch other processes,
restricting their labels so that they can reveal data only to pro-
cesses in the compartment. It may also give the right to declassify
to programs trusted to sanitize data; these programs can then re-
lease tainted data outside the compartment. Programs can use the
same discretionary rights to establish identity and integrity, and to
protect the right to send messages to a port—that is, to implement
a send capability.
Three features of the Asbestos label design are particularly im-
portant for decentralized compartments. First, a special sensitivity
level, ⋆, represents declassiﬁcation privilege with respect to a com-
partment. Second, when sending a message, a process can supply
additionally restrictive discretionary labels on top of the process
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mitted to the receiving application for possible analysis. Finally,
Asbestos processes have separate send and receive labels with dif-
ferent defaults for future compartments, allowing policies that tran-
sitively prevent two processes from communicating without unduly
restricting either process’s ability to communicate with the rest of
the system.
5.1 Label basics
In general, information ﬂow labels form a lattice, a partial order
in which any ﬁnite set of labels has unique least upper and great-
est lower bounds [7]. The partial order ⊑ determines whether one
label is dominated by another. The least-upper-bound operator ⊔
is used to combine security classes—when a process reads objects
with different classes, for instance. The greatest-lower-bound op-
erator ⊓, unusual in other label systems, is used in Asbestos for
declassiﬁcation.
In Asbestos, each process P has two labels, a send label PS and
a receive label PR (somewhat analogous to IX’s current and max-
imum labels). The send label represents the process’s current con-
tamination, the receive label the maximum contamination it is able
to accept from others. To ﬁrst order, P may send to Q if
PS ⊑ QR, (1)
which means that Q is able to receive messages from processes at
P’s current contamination level, and also that Q is willing to accept
contamination atP’slevel.Whenthemessage isdelivered, Q’ssend
label is contaminated by P’s send label, since information ﬂows
from P to Q. Again to ﬁrst order,
QS ← QS ⊔ PS, (2)
the least upper bound on the two send labels.
Asbestos compartments are named by handles, which are 61-
bit numbers. Any process can create a compartment with the
new handle system call, which returns a previously-unused handle
and, asexplained below, grants the calling process privilege for that
handle. Handle values are unique since boot time. Thus, unlike a
ﬁle descriptor value, a given handle value refers to the same handle
in all contexts. The 61-bit namespace is large enough that allocat-
ing handles at a rate of 1 billion per second would require 73 years
to exhaust all values. The kernel generates handles by encrypting
a counter with a 61-bit block cipher (derived from Blowﬁsh [38]),
resulting in an unpredictable but non-repeating sequence of values;
the unpredictability closes certain covert channels by concealing
the number of handles that have been created at any given time.
However, handles are not in any way self-authenticating [41]—
simply knowing a handle’s value confers no additional privilege.
Handle privileges are represented by levels, which are members
of the ordered set [⋆,0,1,2,3]; in send labels, ⋆ is the lowest or
most privileged level, and 3 is the highest or least privileged level.
The default levels lie in between; they are 1 for send labels and
2 for receive labels. The reasons for this difference are explained
below.
A label, then, is just a function from handles to levels. We
write them as functions, and also using set notation, such as
{h1 0,h2 1,2}; the default level, which appears without a handle at
the end of the list, applies to all handles not mentioned explicitly.
To compare two labels, we compare each of their components:
L1 ⊑ L2 iff L1(h) ≤ L2(h) for all h.
Withthisordering, theleast-upper-bound and greatest-lower-bound
operators, ⊔ and ⊓, are (L1 ⊔ L2)(h) = max(L1(h),L2(h)) and
(L1 ⊓ L2)(h) = min(L1(h),L2(h)).
FS:
File Server
Users u and v
U: Shell
User u
V: Shell
User v
UT: Terminal
User u
US = {uT 3,1}
UR = {uT 3,2}
VS = {vT 3,1}
VR = {vT 3,2}
UTS = {uT 3,1}
UTR = {uT 3,2}
VS  ⊑ UTR
({vT 3,1}  ⊑ {uT 3,2})
US ⊑ UTR
Figure 2: Simpliﬁed process communication with labels. The ﬁle
server is trusted.
5.2 Privacy
We now examine how Asbestos labels can provide privacy through
information ﬂow control, using a simple four-process example: a
trusted multi-user ﬁle server, user shells for users u and v, and a
terminal to which user u is logged in. The system’s goal is to allow
user u’s information to pass freely over the terminal while prevent-
ing other users’ information from escaping. We ﬁrst assume that
process labels are assigned out of band; the next section shows how
they are assigned in a decentralized fashion.
Each user needs a security compartment, so we assign each user
u a taint handle uT. The next step is to differentiate processes that
have seen u’s private data from those that have not. We will use
send labels for this purpose, since they track the ﬂow of messages
by raising receivers’ levels with ⊔. We mark the send label of any
process that sees u’s private data by setting uT’s level higher then
the default of 1. If we choose level 3 for user taints, a process with
PS(uT) = 1 (the default send level) hasn’t seen u’s data, while a
process with PS(uT) = 3 has.
Now for receive labels. By default, processes have PR(uT) =
2. This is below the user taint level of 3, so a process’s receive
label must be explicitly raised, to uT 3, to allow it to receive u’s
data. Raising receive labels makes the system more permissive, so
in Asbestos, it requires special privilege: processes are not free to
raise their receive labels arbitrarily.
Figure 2 shows the resulting system. The shell processes U and
V are tainted with uT and vT (that is, US(uT) = 3 and VR(vT) =
3), and their receive labels allow them to receive the data of their
respective users. Any processes they create or communicate with
will have the same characteristics. User u’s terminal, UT, has the
same labels as U. U can send messages to UT, since US ⊑ UTR,
but V cannot, since VS(vT) > UTR(vT), and neither can any other
process that has seen v’s data.
Discretionary contamination Consider the ﬁle server FS in Fig-
ure 2. To maintain the system’s information ﬂow properties, the
ﬁle server must label ﬁles: a process that reads user u’s ﬁle must
become tainted with uT 3. (We worry about writes later.) The ﬁle
server must be able to taint different users’ processes in different
ways, so it cannot simply use Equation 2 to taint processes.
In Asbestos, the ﬁle server can selectively taint messages with
the appropriate handle by providing an optional contamination la-
bel CS when sending a message. This label raises the sender’s send
label to a new effective send label ES = PS ⊔ CS. The effective
label, not the true send label, is used to check information ﬂow and
to contaminate the receiver’s send label. Equations (1) and (2) thus
become
ES ⊑ QR and (3)
QS ← QS ⊔ ES. (4)
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special privilege; processes can arbitrarily contaminate the mes-
sages they send. The default contamination label is {⋆}, which, as
the lowest possible label, adds no additional contamination.
This is our ﬁrst example of an optional, or discretionary, use of
the label system. The idea is simple: when processes can control
their interactions with the label system—in ways that don’t violate
basic information ﬂow properties, of course—the label system can
implement more security policies, potentially including all access
control interactions needed in an operating system.
The four levels The label assignment above prevents v’s data
from reaching any processes except for an explicitly initialized set,
those with PR(vT) = 3. But Asbestos’s four levels 0–3, and its
different defaults for send and receive labels, allow other policies
as well. Say, for example, we represent user taint by uT 2, rather
than uT 3. Then U and V could communicate with each other, as
well as with other processes in the system; and we could still pre-
vent privacy violations via UT, by lowering its receive label, to
{vT 1,2}. UT could communicate with U, but still not with V,since
VS(vT) = 2; and if U received a message from V, its send label
would rise to vT 2, preventing further communication with UT.
Thus, when user taint uses level 3, the system defaults to deny-
ing user-tainted messages, and the compartment manager must ex-
plicitly raise the receive level of each process allowed to receive
user data. When user taint uses level 2, the system defaults to al-
lowing communication, and those processes that shouldn’t receive
user data must have their receive labels explicitly lowered. (An ap-
plication of the latter might be allowing anyone to read a ﬁle so
long as they don’t send the contents to the network daemon.) Dif-
ferent send and receive defaults make it easy to select either model,
whereas implementing the latter model in a traditional information
ﬂow system would require changing every label in the system.
This also explains why Asbestos labels have levels 0–3. We need
two levelsfor send and receive defaults, and levels above and below
each of these defaults. In send labels, 1 usually corresponds to the
absence of taint; 2 to a “partial taint”, as in the latter model, where
most communication remains unimpeded; and 3 to full taint, where
most communication is prevented. Similarly, in receive labels, 3
indicates the right to be tainted arbitrarily; 2 is the default; and
1 prevents communication with any tainted process. 0 is used for
integrity and capabilities, as we’ll see below.
Multi-level policies requiring hierarchical sensitivity classiﬁca-
tion can be emulated in Asbestos using multiple compartments. For
instance, to support unclassiﬁed, secret, and top-secret levels, the
security administrator can use two compartments: one for secret,
s, and one for top-secret, t. A process’s receive label then reﬂects
its owner’s security clearance: {2} for unclassiﬁed, {s3,2} for se-
cret, and {s3,t3,2} for top-secret. Similarly, send labels reﬂect the
highest level of data a process has actually seen: {1} for unclassi-
ﬁed, {s3,1} for secret, and {s3,t3,1} for top-secret.
Odd label values, such as a send label of {t3,1}, are also possi-
ble. Though this has no direct mapping to a security level, a process
with such a send label will only be able to send to processes with
top-secret clearance, so the desired information ﬂow properties are
preserved. In general, however, the Asbestos design is streamlined
for largenumbers of non-hierarchical compartments rather thantra-
ditional, military-style sensitivity classiﬁcations. In particular, we
believe that scalability to many compartments is a requirement for
MAC to protect user data in today’s Internet applications.
Receive labels and dynamic taint Asbestos receive labels limit
the taint that processes may receive, and thus the effects of taint
accumulation. For example, the send labels in Figure 2 will not
change with respect to uT and vT, absent intervention by some
privileged process. Asbestos labels can, however, support a range
of other policies. For example, UR and VR could both be set to
{uT 3,vT 3,2}, allowing either shell to read either user’s informa-
tion. Once U reads v’s data, it will lose the ability to send messages
to UT—but, unfortunately, might still be able to convey some in-
formation by exploiting covert channels. Following the principle of
least privilege, it is better not to raise U’s receive label if it doesn’t
need access to v’s data, but this policy choice is up to the applica-
tion designer. Like Figure 2, our Web server sets receive labels to
prevent dynamic taint except where speciﬁcally needed.
5.3 Declassiﬁcation privileges
Asbestos decentralizes declassiﬁcation using the special ⋆ level: a
process with PS(h) = ⋆ has declassiﬁcation privilege with respect
to h, or equivalently, is said to control compartment h. This priv-
ilege concretely means that other processes cannot contaminate P
with respect to h. Even if P receives a message from a process Q
with QS(h) = 3, PS(h) remains ⋆, the lowest level. P can thus for-
ward data from Q to less tainted processes, thereby declassifying
information with respect to h. In notation, deﬁne
L
⋆ =
(
⋆ if L(h) = ⋆
3 otherwise.
The contamination step from Equation (4) then becomes
QS ← QS ⊔ (ES ⊓ Q
⋆
S); (5)
theES⊓Q
⋆
S termgives⋆levelsinQS precedence over contamination
from ES. Only a process itself can remove ⋆ levels from its send
label, using a special variant of the send system call.
In our example, the ﬁle server, which is trusted by both users
to store their ﬁles, and which should apply a minimal taint to any
ﬁle data it returns (rather than being tainted indeﬁnitely high), has
privilege with respect to both uT and vT:
FSS = {uT ⋆,vT ⋆,1},
FSR = {uT 3,vT 3,2}.
The receive label allows FS to receive messages tainted arbitrarily
with respect to uT or vT; but regardless of the taints it receives, its
send label will stay the same for uT and vT.
Decontamination A process initially has privilege for every han-
dle it creates: the new handle system call sets PS(h) = ⋆ for ev-
ery handle it returns. Since h was previously unused, all other pro-
cesses start with QS(h) ≥ 1 (the default send level). Normal mes-
sage exchange with P will not change this situation. However, As-
bestos allows a process with privilege to explicitly distribute priv-
ilege to other processes, either by forking or using a mechanism
called decontamination. This adds ﬂexibility but, since a privileged
process couldalready decontaminate and forwarddata, doesn’t fun-
damentally change the system’s information ﬂow properties. This
dynamic compartment creation and privilege manipulation differs
from systems such as Jif, which has a ﬁxed hierarchy of users con-
trolling various I/O channels and code.
A process with declassiﬁcation privilege for handle h can de-
contaminate other processes’ labels with respect to h by lowering
their send labels and raising their receive labels. This uses two
more optional label arguments to the send system call, namely a
decontaminate-send label DS and a decontaminate-receive label
DR. The decontaminate-send label is used to lower the receiver’s
send label, and the decontaminate-receive label to raise the re-
ceiver’s receive label. Both of these operations make the system
more permissive, and thus require special privilege with respect to
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Equations (3) and (5) become
ES ⊑ QR ⊔ DR and (6)
QS ← (QS ⊓ DS) ⊔ (ES ⊓ Q
⋆
S), QR ← QR ⊔ DR. (7)
The system must also check that whenever a decontamination label
might change the receiver’s labels, the sender controls the relevant
compartments: that is, that PS(h) = ⋆ whenever DS(h) < 3 or
DR(h) > ⋆.
5.4 Integrity
The ﬁle server can thus accept requests from any user without fear
of contamination and can declassify user data as appropriate. Of
course, a useful ﬁle server must also implement an integrity policy
to prevent arbitrary processes from overwriting users’ data. An in-
tegrity policy can either be mandatory—transitively blocking any
ﬂow of low-integrity data into a user’s ﬁles—or discretionary. Let
us ﬁrst consider a discretionary policy, in which only processes that
speak for user u can write to u’s ﬁles, but their writes are free to in-
corporate data from less trusted sources.
Speaking for u is a positive right, not a taint, and whether a pro-
cess speaks for u isunrelated to whether or not it has read any of u’s
secret data. We thus need a new compartment to represent speak-
ing for u, represented by uG, user u’s grant handle. A process can
speak for u only if PS(uG) ≤ 0. Hence, our ﬁle server must verify
PS(uG) ≤ 0 before accepting a write to u’s ﬁle from P.
Asbestos supports such integrity checks with a fourth (and ﬁ-
nal) optional label argument to send, the veriﬁcation label V. The
veriﬁcation label temporarily lowers—restricts—the receiver’s ef-
fective receive label. Thus, the sender proves with V that its labels
are below a constraint independent of the receive label. Concretely,
the label check from Equation (6) becomes
ES ⊑ (QR ⊔ DR) ⊓ V. (8)
Since ES = PS ⊔ CS, this implies that PS ⊑ V, and for the check
to succeed, the veriﬁcation label must be an upper bound on the
sender’s send label. Unlike the other optional labels CS, DS, and
DR, the veriﬁcation label is also passed up to the receiving applica-
tion when the message is received. Thus, the application knows an
upper bound on the sender’s send label. In our ﬁle server example,
a process writing u’s ﬁle must supply V = {uG 0,3} to prove it
speaks for u. The ﬁle server, in turn, veriﬁes the process speaks for
u by checking V(uG) ≤ 0 before accepting a write to u’s ﬁle.
An alternative design might eliminate V and just supply message
recipients with a copy of the sender’s send label—in effect, con-
veying all of a process’s credentials with every message it sends.
However, such designs lead to security problems in which an at-
tacker can trick a process into exercising unintended privileges, a
pitfall known as the confused deputy problem [12]. In our example,
a process that speaks for multiple users must explicitly name the
credentials it intends to exercise for each write.
Level 0 and mandatory integrity The 0 level permits the con-
struction of mandatory integrity policies. For example, a process P
with PS(uG) = 0 can speak for u, but since 0 is less than the de-
fault send level of 1, it cannot further disseminate the privilege: the
minute P receives a message from a process Q that does not speak
for u (QS(uG) ≥ 1), PS will become tainted and P will lose its abil-
ity to speak for u. Thus, P cannot act for Q and relay low-integrity
data into u’s ﬁles.
As with secrecy, different defaults in send and receive labels al-
low targeted exclusion of particular processes. An example is pre-
venting system ﬁles from being corrupted from the network. The
ﬁle server can allocate a compartment, s, and require V(s) ≤ 1 for
writes to system ﬁles. Setting the network daemon’s send label to
{s2,1} then ensures that no process contaminated with data from
the network can overwrite system ﬁles.
5.5 Capabilities and preventing contamination
The discretionary veriﬁcation label can be used to implement many
application-deﬁned security policies, but it is limited in one impor-
tant way: An application can choose to ignore a message after ex-
amining V, but since the message was already delivered (to allow
V to be examined), the application’s labels have already been con-
taminated with the message’s taint. In general this taint cannot be
undone. Thus, V can ﬂexibly verify integrity but cannot prevent in-
appropriate contamination. Imagine, for example, amail reader that
starts an untrusted program to read an attachment. The mail reader
can, andshould, accept contamination fromother systemprocesses,
such asthe ﬁlesystem; but though it needs tocommunicate withthe
attachment program, it doesn’t want to accept contamination from
it.A compromised attachment that develops ahigh taint should lose
the ability to send to the mail reader.
What is needed is a way to shift a simple form of message ﬁlter-
ing into the kernel. Asbestos supports this in a straightforward way
by integrating communication ports with the label system. The re-
sult not only prevents undesired contamination but also ends up
providing the semantics of capability-based send rights.
First, the port namespace is the same as the handle value space,
so port names can be used as label compartments. Second, every
port p is associated with a port receive label or port label pR. This
label is used to lower, or restrict, the process’s receive label, but
only for messages delivered to that port. It thus acts like a veriﬁ-
cation label imposed by the receiver, rather than the sender. For a
message sent to port p, the label check from Equation (8) becomes
ES ⊑ (QR ⊔ DR) ⊓ V ⊓ pR. (9)
The port label furthermore restricts how much a receive label
can be decontaminated. A process that controls a compartment can
grant another process the right to receive tainted messages with DR,
and simultaneously taint its send label with CS. This idiom is com-
moninpractice;our Webserver usesit,for example, tocontaminate
worker processes with the relevant user taint uT. Some processes,
such as long-running system servers, may want to avoid undesired
taint, however. They do so by setting their port labels to low values
(which prevent contamination). The kernel will reject any message
that attempts to decontaminate a receive label beyond what is al-
lowed by the port label; speciﬁcally, it checks that DR ⊑ pR.
Port labels, like veriﬁcation labels, are entirely discretionary.
Each process solely controls the port labels for all ports for which it
has receive rights, and neither lowering nor raising a port label re-
quires special privilege. Processes supply an initial port label when
creating a port; most often this is {3}, which adds no restrictions
relative to the process’s receive label, but it can be {2} or anything
else. Asa convenience, the kernel modiﬁes thisport label by setting
pR(p) ← 0 before returning the new port. Since all other processes
in the system initially have PS(p) ≥ 1 (the default send level), no
other process can send to p until P explicitly grants access. How-
ever, the set port label system call, which changes a port’s label,
doesn’t modify its input. By resetting the port label to {3} (with no
exception for p itself), the process can allow anyone in the system
to send messages to p, subject only to the process receive label’s
restrictions.
Capabilities The resulting port label system supports capability-
like send rights. When process P ﬁrst creates port p, no one else
can send to p. P can grant the right to send to p by decontaminating
another process’s send label with respect to p; that is, it can send
22P, Q Processes
p, h Ports, handles
⋆,0,1,2,3 Label levels, in increasing order
L, C, D, V, E Labels (functions from handles to levels)
PS Process P’s send label
PR Process P’s receive label
pR Port p’s receive label
L1 ⊑ L2 Label comparison:
true iff ∀h, L1(h) ≤ L2(h)
L1 ⊔ L2 Least-upper-bound label:
(L1 ⊔ L2)(h) = max(L1(h),L2(h))
L1 ⊓ L2 Greatest-lower-bound label:
(L1 ⊓ L2)(h) = min(L1(h),L2(h))
L
⋆ Stars-only label:
L
⋆(h) =
(
⋆ if L(h) = ⋆,
3 otherwise
Figure 3: Notation.
send(p,data,CS,DS,V,DR) // Send message to port p
Let Q be the process with receive rights for p
Let ES = PS ⊔ CS
Requirements:
(1) ES ⊑ (QR ⊔ DR) ⊓ V ⊓ pR
(2) If DS(h) < 3, then PS(h) = ⋆
(3) If DR(h) > ⋆, then PS(h) = ⋆
(4) DR ⊑ pR
Effects:
Grant DS and contaminate with ES,
but preserve QS’s ⋆ handles
QS ← (QS ⊓ DS) ⊔ (ES ⊓ Q
⋆
S)
QR ← QR ⊔ DR
new port(L)
Let p be an unused port
Effects:
pR ← L
pR(p) ← 0
PS(p) ← ⋆
Return p
set port label(p,L)
Requirement:
P has receive rights for p
Effect:
pR ← L
Figure 4: Label operations associated withthree Asbestos system calls.
P is the calling process.
Q a message with DS = {p⋆,3}. Q can then further redistribute
that send right. Note that it is primarily the port receive label, pR,
rather than the process label, PR, that prevents arbitrary processes
from sending to p. A process can create many ports with different
receive labels and, just like capabilities, separately distribute the
right to send to each port.
5.6 Summary and implementation
Figure 3 summarizes the notation developed in earlier sections, and
Figure 4 gives the ﬁnal versions of the label operations associated
with the send, new port, and set port label system calls.
In user space, a label is represented as an array of handle values
plus a default level. A 64-bit number can represent a label entry:
the upper 61 bits are the handle value, the lower 3 bits encode its
level in that label.
In kernel space, each active handle corresponds to a 64-byte data
structurecalledavnode. Forport handles, thisstructureincludes the
port label and a reference to the process with receive rights. A hash
table maps handle values to vnodes. Vnodes are reference counted;
when all kernel references to a vnode disappear, the kernel may
reuse its memory.
Since a series of label operations accompanies every IPC, the
kernel label implementation has major impact on performance and
memory usage. In our current design, a label points to a sorted ar-
ray of chunks, each of which is a sorted array of up to 64 vnode
pointers. Since these pointers are 8-byte aligned, their lower 3 bits
are again available for the corresponding levels. Labels are refer-
ence counted and updated copy-on-write, so multiple entities can
sharelabel memory when appropriate. Additionally, chunks areref-
erence counted and updated copy-on-write, and multiple labels can
share chunks. Each chunk is marked with the minimum and max-
imum of its vnodes’ levels, as is each label. This helps optimize
certain common operations; for example, if L2’s maximum level is
no larger than L1’s minimum level, then L1⊔L2 = L1 by deﬁnition.
In the worst case, of course, operations like ⊑, ⊓, and ⊔ are linear
in the size of their input labels. Optimization opportunities remain,
for example when most of label’s handle levels are ⋆, and we plan
to improve the label implementation for future work. The smallest
label is about 300 bytes long, including space for one chunk.
6 EVENT PROCESSES
Labels alone don’t work well for processes that handle multiple
users’ privatedata. Toavoidaccumulating contamination, suchpro-
cesses would have to be trusted with declassiﬁcation privilege by
each relevant user, leaving them over-trusted and vulnerable. Exist-
ing OS abstractions areno help. Onthe one hand, user-level threads
are efﬁcient but share an address space, and therefore do not pro-
vide isolation. On the other, forking a separate process per user
provides isolation, but may have low performance due to operat-
ing system overheads, such as memory. What’s needed is a new
abstraction that combines the performance beneﬁts of cooperative
user threads with the isolation beneﬁts of forking new processes.
Many efﬁcient servers [20, 33, 43, 45] use an implementation
pattern that suggests a solution to this problem. All server work is
driven by a simple event-driven dispatch loop:
while (1) {
event = get next event();
user = lookup user(event);
if (user not yet seen)
user.state = create state();
process event(event, user);
}
This arrangement is efﬁcient, since only one process is involved,
and there is little space overhead beyond the minimum memory
required to hold each user’s state. The missing piece is a way to
isolate the state of different users, and to ensure that the process’s
labels are set correctly while executing on behalf of each user.
6.1 The event process abstraction
An Asbestos event process abstracts the notion of a subset of pro-
cess state belonging to a single user. As with processes, the ker-
nel restricts an event process’s privileges while it handles incoming
messages for a user, and isolates different event processes’ state;
but as with user-level threads, event processes limit concurrency
and impose low space and scheduling overheads. Each event pro-
cess is associated with one conventional base process, from which
its initial state is drawn. The event process’s kernel state consists
only of a send label, a receive label, receive rights for ports, and
a set of private memory pages, plus some bookkeeping informa-
tion, altogether occupying 44 bytesof Asbestos kernel memory. For
comparison, Asbestos’s minimal process structure takes 320 bytes.
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event-driven dispatch loop above:
1. ep checkpoint(&msg);
2. if (!state.initialized) {
3. initialize state(state);
4. state.reply = new port();
5. }
6. process msg(msg, state);
7. ep yield();
Intuitively, many event process entities now share the event loop,
each with its own isolated state. The two ep system calls manage
control ﬂow transfer between events. The single “state” variable
refers to a different user in each event process.
When the base process ﬁrst calls the ep checkpoint system call,
it enters the event process realm, and the base process itself will
never run again. The process is de-scheduled until a message ar-
rives on a port for which the base process, or any of its event pro-
cesses, holdsreceive rights. Thekernel then schedules an event pro-
cess to receive that message. If a particular event process holds re-
ceive rights for the relevant port, then ep checkpoint returns in that
event process’s context, restoring its private labels, receive rights,
and memory. If, on the other hand, the base process holds the port’s
receive rights, the kernel creates a new event process and returns
in that event process’s context. The event process starts with send
and receive labels copied from the base process’s labels, no receive
rights, and no private memory pages.
When ep checkpoint returns a message in an event process’s
context, the label contamination and declassiﬁcation rules are ap-
plied to that event process’s labels. The kernel makes event process
memory writes private by marking all shared pages copy-on-write,
and an event process gets receive rights for any ports it creates.
After it ﬁnishes processing its message, the event process calls
the ep yield system call. This call saves any changes to the event
process’s labels, receive rights, and memory and then suspends
the whole process, just as when the base process ﬁrst called
ep checkpoint. No event process will run until another message
is available for delivery.
Event processes often make temporary modiﬁcations to mem-
ory that are useful only for the current event. To keep the kernel
from saving such memory modiﬁcations across ep yields, an event
process can call ep clean to revert a speciﬁed memory range to
the base process’s state. An event process frees all its resources,
including its kernel-maintained state, with the ep exit system call.
Event processes can execute most system calls, including send-
ing and receiving messages, allocating memory, and so forth. Event
processes’ execution states, unlike their memory states, are not iso-
lated: an event process may block indeﬁnitely in recv, blocking the
entire process, or even exit via the process-wide exit system call.
Usage Messages delivered to a base process handle typically cor-
respond to the advent of new client processes or new client net-
work connections, exactly the situations in which it is appropriate
to create a new event process. An event process can tell it is new
by checking and setting a memory location that the base process
initializes to zero; a new event process inherits the zero, while a
re-activation of an existing event process will see its previous non-
zero write to that location. A new event process will typically allo-
cate itself a new port on which to receive messages, as in line 4 of
the above code sample. The system ensures that messages to this
port will be delivered to the current event process, which can thus
send queries to ﬁle or database servers on behalf of the current user
and later receive any replies. For some applications, newly created
event processes might exit immediately without creating a handle;
though this cannot store state between messages, it does avoid ac-
cumulating taint.
An event process has all the power of an ordinary process to
restrict its labels, for example to reﬂect the fact that it is processing
a speciﬁc user’s private data. In the multi-user ﬁle server example
in Section 5.2, the ﬁle server would end up contaminating an event
process’s send label with the user’s uC handle, correctly reﬂecting
that just the event process was contaminated.
The base process does not explicitly create event processes, nor
does it know of their existence. In fact, once it calls ep checkpoint,
the base process never executes again in user space, and there is no
way to change its memory. Different event processes are also un-
aware of each other’s existence except possibly through message-
based communication, preserving the independence and isolation
represented by per-event process labels. We plan for future work
to investigate mechanisms for event processes to selectively share
memory, subject to label checks.
6.2 Implementation
Event processes are efﬁcient for two reasons. First, the kernel
scheduling cost is little higher than that of a single process, even
with many event processes. Second, the memory overhead of an
event process can be as low as a single page of memory—to hold
the event process’s user-level state—plus a few hundred bytes of
kernel state.
While event process memory acts like a copy-on-write copy of
the base process’s memory, the implementation is optimized for
event processes that modify very little memory. The memory state
of each dormant event process includes just a list of modiﬁed pages
and the modiﬁed pages themselves. That is, event processes do not
keep their own page tables. A running event process borrows the
base process’s page table data structure in the kernel, changing it in
exactly those places that differ.
Typically, programs scatter users’ data across the stack in addi-
tion to various places on the heap. This would lead to a relatively
large number of pages that are unnecessarily speciﬁc to each event
process. Some of these pages merely hold temporary variables, oth-
ers must persist across the processing of several messages. Storing
the non-temporary data in a contained data structure on the heap
can minimize the number of persistent pages required. This data
management technique is much more natural in event-driven pro-
gramming, which the event process system calls symbiotically en-
courage. Thus, event processes tend to use minimal private mem-
ory, and the optimization of only storing page table differences is
proﬁtable in practice.
7 WEB SERVER DESIGN
The Asbestos Web server is based on the OKWS system for
UNIX [20]. In the original OKWS design, a demultiplexer, ok-
demux, accepts each incoming TCP connection and parses its
HTTP headers to determine what service the remote client is re-
questing. It then hands the connection off to a worker process spe-
cialized for providing that service. OKWS’s goal is to isolate ser-
vices, so that one compromised service cannot affect others. Like
its UNIX predecessor, OKWS on Asbestos also isolates services
in different worker processes, but it additionally enforces user iso-
lation within workers via event processes: a compromised worker
cannot leak one user’s information to other users.
7.1 Startup
OKWS is started by a launcher process. The launcher spawns ok-
demux, site-speciﬁc workers requested by the site operator, and two
other processes seen inFigure1,idd and ok-dbproxy. Theprocesses
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ok-demux idd Worker W
1. u’s TCP connection
2. Grant uC ⋆
3. Lookup UN/PW
4. Grant uG ⋆,uT ⋆
5. Grant uT ⋆
6. Grant uC ⋆,uG ⋆,
Contaminate uT 3
7. Create W[u]
8. Grant uW ⋆; read/write
Figure 5: OKWS message ﬂow for handling user u’s Web request.
exchange and inherit handles to establish the communication paths
seen in the diagram.
The ok-demux must be certain that it is communicating with the
worker processes that the launcher started and wants to avoid trust-
ing workers to identify themselves correctly. Thus, the launcher
grants a process-speciﬁc veriﬁcation handle to each process it
starts.Theok-demux collectsthesehandle valuesfromthelauncher.
When a worker identiﬁes itself to the ok-demux, it must provide a
veriﬁcation label V containing its veriﬁcation handle at level 0, al-
lowingtheok-demux toverifythat itspeaks fortherelevant process.
Other designs, such as having the launcher mediate initial commu-
nication with the workers, would also be possible.
In the current prototype, a process crash would necessitate a
restart of the whole process suite, though a more mature version
of launcher could restart dead processes (as in OKWS on Unix).
7.2 Basic connection handling
We now describe the data path of a simple Web request to OKWS
running on Asbestos; Figure 5 shows the steps. When a user u
makes an HTTP connection:
1. The user-level network server netd accepts incoming TCP pack-
ets from the network. Once netd has accepted u’s connection, it
allocates a new port uC to act as a “socket” to which processes
can send READ and WRITE messages. The port label, uCR, is
set to {uC 0,2}, so that no process can initially send to it. Sec-
tion 7.7 describes netd further.
2. As it started up, ok-demux registered with netd to listen for in-
coming TCPconnections on themachine’s Webport. Therefore,
netd notiﬁes ok-demux of the new connection by granting it uC
at level ⋆.
3. ok-demux reads network data from u over port uC until it can
authenticate u. Currently, OKWS uses a simple username and
password pair, though more sophisticated handshakes are pos-
sible. It sends u’s username and password to OKWS’s identity
server, idd, which is described in Section 7.4.
4. If u provided a valid login, idd grants ok-demux two handles
corresponding to u, a taint handle uT and a grant handle uG,
both at level ⋆. These handles function like the similarly-named
handles in Section 5.
5. ok-demux grants uT ⋆ to netd, which then raises its receive label
to contain uT 3 and raises uCR to {uC 0,uT 3,2}. These changes
allow uT-tainted data to escape over the network, but only via
uC. From now on, netd will respond to all messages on uC (such
as READs) with replies contaminated with uT 3.
6. When ok-demux read TCP payload bytes from netd in Step 3,
it also noted which service u is requesting. If this service ex-
ists, ok-demux forwards uC to the worker W that provides the
service, simultaneously contaminating W’s send label with uT 3
and granting it uG ⋆.
7. Worker W returns from ep checkpoint into a new event process
W[u], receiving uC ⋆, uG ⋆, and the contamination uT 3.
8. Event process W[u] makes a new port uW and grants it to netd
at level ⋆. It then reads u’s request by sending read requests to
netd’s port uC, yielding, and reading netd’s replies to uW upon
wakeup. After reading and parsing u’s entire request, the event
process formulates a reply and writes it to uC.
9. W[u] calls ep exit.
We brieﬂy argue that the worker W[u] can communicate with u
as intended. W[u]’s send label is contaminated with uT 3 in Step 6,
but netd’s receive label was changed in Step 5 to accommodate that
contamination. Consequently, the kernel will allow W[u] to send
data over uC to netd and across the network to u.
The security of the protocol comes because any process or event
process that accesses u’s data either is trusted and has uT ⋆ in its
send label, or is not trusted and has uT 3. In this example, netd, idd
and ok-demux have uT ⋆, but we assume them uncompromised (see
Section 7.8 for further discussion). The event process W[u] and its
descendents have had the opportunity to see user u’s private data,
and therefore have uT 3 in their send labels. All other processes,
such as those working on behalf of a different user v, cannot re-
ceive messages from W[u] or its descendents, and therefore cannot
receive u’s data. Even if such data theft were possible, netd would
not allow its trafﬁc over the network: any process with {uT 3,vT 3}
in its send label cannot send data to uC due to that port’s port label
restrictions.
Note that while the kernel enforces security policies that iso-
late user data ﬂows from one another, OKWS’s concept of user is
opaque to the operating system. Having declassiﬁcation privilege
for an OKWS user’s handle, such as uT, implies nothing about ac-
cess to sensitive system resources, such as the kernel disk image or
the system password ﬁle. An Asbestos application like OKWS has
no need for “superuser” access, with all of its attendant dangers.
7.3 Web sessions
Since HTTP is stateless, many Web servers support storage of ses-
siondata that persistsover multipleHTTPconnections. OKWScan
securely store per-user server-side statewithsimple additions tothe
above protocol. When supporting sessions, the ok-demux process
stores a table of all recently active user-worker pairs. In Step 6, if
user u requests service fromworker W, ok-demux looks inthistable
for a port to the event process W[u]. If it ﬁnds such a port, it for-
wards uC directly to W[u]. If it does not, it forwards u’s connection
as normal, causing a new event process to be forked. When the new
event process allocates port uW in Step 7, it grants it to ok-demux,
which then inserts it into its session table for future use.
The worker event process writes session data to memory as nor-
mal. To preserve this state across connections, it must call ep yield
instead of ep exit in Step 9. Because ok-demux sends u’s requests
for W directly toW[u], those requests will seeany previous changes
tosession state. At theend of the event loop, event processes should
typically call ep clean before yielding to discard all pages mod-
iﬁed since the checkpoint that do not hold session data; this will
typically include the stack. When a user u’s session times out or
u explicitly logs off, u’s worker event processes call ep exit and
ok-demux cleans u’s user-worker pairs out of its session table.
7.4 Managing identities
In Steps 3 and 4, the ok-demux veriﬁes user u’s login credentials
by querying an identity server idd. This server associates persistent
user identiﬁcation data, such as username, user ID, and user pass-
word, with the more temporary grant and taint handles uT and uG.
When idd answers a successful login query in Step 4, it either gen-
erates new uT and uG handles (if u has not logged in recently), or
25returns cached uT and uG handles if available. In the current imple-
mentation, idd stores user information in a relational database (see
Section 7.5) and never cleans its cache. The identity server has spe-
cial access through ok-dbproxy to this password database, which
other processes such as workers cannot access directly. Thus, the
lookup in Step 3 will result in a database query per ﬁrst-time login.
7.5 Database interaction
Asbestos offers preliminary database support to worker processes
through a port of the Unix package SQLite [40]. A separate pro-
cess called ok-dbproxy interposes on all OKWS database accesses,
converting Asbestos labels and security policies to data types and
functions native to standard SQLite. With database access, OKWS
can extend its label-based security policy to one that persists across
system reboots. In our current implementation, ok-dbproxy is both
privileged and trusted: it is trusted to contaminate and check labels
to ensure secrecy and integrity respectively, and isprivileged in that
idd grants it all user taint handles at level ⋆.
ok-dbproxy adds a “user ID” column to the table deﬁnition of
every table accessed by OKWS workers. The workers themselves
cannot access or change this column. When ok-dbproxy receives
INSERTs, UPDATEs, or other SQL queries that write to the
database, it ﬁrst checks that the request came with a valid username
u and a verify label V bounded above by {uT 3,uG 0,2}. This ver-
ify label conveys two important facts. First, the sender’s send label
does not contain handles other than uT at level 3, and therefore the
sender has not been contaminated by any data aside from his own.
Second, because the verify label contains uG at level 0, the sender
was granted the ability to write data for u, either by idd or one of
its proxies (i.e., ok-demux). After approving the given verify label,
ok-dbproxy queries idd to afﬁrmthe binding between user u and the
two handles uT and uG. If all checks pass, ok-dbproxy rewrites u’s
request so that every row written will have u’s user ID in the private
“user ID” column.
Whenever a worker process fetches data from the database via
SELECT, the ok-dbproxy process reapplies the appropriate con-
tamination to returned rows. If a row’s user ID column contains
u’s ID, then ok-dbproxy returns the row’s data contaminated with
uT 3; it queries idd for uT if it does not have this mapping in cache.
Each row is returned as a separate message with a separate taint,
and to ﬁnish the request, ok-dbproxy sends an untainted message
indicating that all data has been returned. Since each worker’s re-
ceive label is limited to receiving at most one user’s taint, a worker
will receive only rows meant for its user, and cannot tell how many
other rows were sent. A more relaxed policy could allow workers
to be tainted with multiple users’ data; but like any dynamic taint-
ing mechanism, this would open a storage channel to the database
through worker process labels.
Our current prototype retroﬁts a standard database with a subset
of Asbestos’s security features; for instance, rows can only be con-
taminated with one handle. We envision future database systems
built speciﬁcally for Asbestos that incorporate labels and event pro-
cesses in a deeper way.
7.6 Decentralized declassiﬁcation
Finally, the OKWS prototype supports decentralized declassiﬁca-
tion. As stated above, if any process, such as user v’s worker event
process, wishestoreaduser u’sdata fromthedatabase, thedatabase
will contaminate the response with uT 3. User v’s event process
will fail to receive this message, since its receive label is not high
enough. Even if it were to receive the message, its send label would
be too contaminated to send data back to v over the connection vC.
But user u may want to share some data with v, such as his pub-
lic proﬁle. That is, user u sometimes needs to declassify his private
data for public access.
OKWS supports semi-trusted declassiﬁers for this purpose. A
declassiﬁer D within OKWS is a worker like any other, except
that the launcher tells ok-demux of its declassiﬁer status. When ok-
demux hands aconnection off toadeclassiﬁer worker D inStep6, it
grants D the handle uT ⋆ instead of contaminating it withuT 3. With
uT at ⋆, the worker D has the privilege to declassify data marked
withuser u’s taint.Thus, when D contacts thedatabase to SELECT
u’s private data, ok-dbproxy’s response does not affect D’s send la-
bel. Thedeclassiﬁer cannow writedeclassiﬁeddata tothedatabase,
providing a veriﬁcation label of uT ⋆ to prove it has this right. Inter-
nally, ok-dbproxy ﬂags a data row as declassiﬁed by setting its user
ID entry to zero. When ok-dbproxy reads data with zeroed user IDs
back out of the database, it does not apply any contamination, and
user v’s worker process can safely read u’s declassiﬁed data out of
the database without affecting its send label. This declassiﬁcation
is decentralized, since it does not directly involve idd, the creator
of handle uT. Furthermore, the D[u] event process is trusted only by
u; it cannot declassify any other user’s data, since ok-demux only
granted it uT ⋆. An attack on a declassiﬁer worker can expose more
of u’s data than intended, but cannot otherwise affect the system’s
information ﬂow.
7.7 Network server
All access to the network in Asbestos is through one process, netd,
which implements the TCP/IP stack (using a port of LWIP [26]),
manages network devices (using a version of Intel’s Linux driver
for the E1000 gigabit card), and creates connections for other pro-
cesses. As the single interface to the network, netd has a privileged
roleand must properly apply restrictionstoconnections it manages.
An application can send a message to netd to request a outgoing
connection to a remote host or to listen for incoming connections.
In either case, netd wraps a new connection with an Asbestos port,
which it grants at level ⋆ to the requesting application. Once a pro-
cess has a port to an open connection, it may perform READ and
WRITE operations to transfer data, CONTROL operations to close
the connection or change the low-water mark, and SELECT oper-
ations to determine available buffer space. On a listening socket,
a process may perform READ operations to accept incoming con-
nections and CONTROL operations to close the socket. In order to
apply labeling to network connections, netd optionally maintains a
taint handle for each connection. When a process tells netd to add
a taint handle to a connection, later messages sent in response to
operations on that connection will be contaminated with the taint
handle at level 3. In OKWS, for example, netd contaminates all
data read from user u’s connection with uT 3 at ok-demux’s behest.
7.8 Trust and privilege in OKWS
Currently, all OKWS components are trusted and/or privileged ex-
cept for the worker processes. We claim that for typical Web sites,
the worker processes correspond to the most vulnerable and error-
prone parts of the computing base. They are vulnerable because
they read, write, store and manipulate sensitive data both from the
network and from the database. They are error-prone for several
software engineering reasons. First, worker code typically does not
face external code audit, both because it varies greatly from site to
site and because many sites’ intellectual property controls discour-
age this practice. Second, load on Web sites can ﬂuctuate wildly:
with unexpected load spikes come emergency performance ﬁxes
that can accidentally circumvent security mechanisms. Third, large
Web sites can run hundreds of thousands of lines of Web code,
26and since writing Web service code that functions correctly (pro-
duces the correct result for honest users) seems simple, it is often
assigned to junior programmers without stringent oversight. Ex-
perience has shown, however, that writing secure Web services is
challenging indeed. We believe securing Web applications with au-
tomatic, kernel-enforced mechanisms to be a signiﬁcant step for
Web security.
In the future, we plan to move more OKWS components out of
the trusted or privileged computing base. For instance, netd could
be decomposed into a simple trusted and privileged component
and an event-process-based workhorse. Thetrustedfront end would
classify incoming packets and ﬁrewall outgoing packets based on
discretionary label rules; it would therefore be privileged with re-
spect to all handles uT, as netd is now. It would forward packets,
once classiﬁed, to the appropriate event processes of an untrusted
netd back end, which would manage the speciﬁcs of TCP buffering
and ﬂow control. Each back-end event process would be contam-
inated with respect to the user on whose behalf it speaks, much
like worker processes in the current system. Similarly, the database
might be decomposed into a trusted, privileged indexer, and an
event-process-based back end that would manage caching and sta-
ble storage.
8 COVERT CHANNELS
Asbestos labels prevent processes from explicitly transmitting
sensitive information to unauthorized parties. However, suppos-
edly isolated processes can still communicate information through
covert channels. Our goal is not to eliminate covert channels—an
impossible task—but rather to make it signiﬁcantly harder to leak
information than on systems used as Internet servers today. While
high-grade military systems are required to quantify the rates of all
covert channels, for Asbestos we content ourselves with enumerat-
ing the channels.
Broadly speaking, covert channels can be categorized as either
timing or storage channels. A process A conveys information to B
with a timing channel if it modulates its use of system resources
in a way that observably affects B’s response time. For instance, A
might ﬂush the processor cache or cause the disk arm to be moved
farther from a subsequent request. We are less concerned with tim-
ing channels than with storage channels, as to some extent timing
channels can be mitigated by limiting processes’ ability to measure
time precisely [13]. (Asbestos offers no such feature, however, and
the problem admittedly becomes harder in the presence of network
communication.)
Storage channels are caused by any state that can be modiﬁed
by process A and observed by B when A is not supposed to transmit
information to B. It was a goal to avoid storage channels that could
be exploited withinasingle process, sothat at least twocooperating
processes are required to communicate information in violation of
a label policy.
The Asbestos design contains two inherent storage channels, the
program counter and labels. The ep yield system call potentially
affects the program counter of a differently tainted event process
by causing it to run. Two colluding, identically-labeled event pro-
cesses can transmit a bit of information by the order in which they
call ep yield if the next scheduled event processes have lesser taint.
This channel is roughly equivalent to the covert channel intention-
ally included by the drop-on-exec feature of IX [28].
The send system call potentially raises the value of the recip-
ient’s send label to an unanticipated value. This is also a storage
channel, as labels can be observed through lack of communication.
Consider a tainted process A attempting to communicate a bit of
sensitive information to an untainted process C. An attacker might
construct two untainted processes, B0 and B1, both of which re-
peatedly send heartbeat messages to C. By sending a message that
contaminates process Bi, A can communicate the value i to C. Such
storage channels are inherent to any system with run-time checking
of dynamic labels [31].
Both of the above channels require at least two processes, which
means they can be mitigated by restricting the ability to fork.
This illustrates one advantage of the event process abstraction as
compared to a more traditional one-label-per-process architecture.
Event processes reduce concurrency, thereby also reducing the
number of send labels and program counters available as storage
channels at any given time.
Other Asbestos kernel data structures have been carefully de-
signed to avoid exploitable storage channels. Handles are gener-
ated by incrementing a 61-bit counter, which is a storage channel.
However, since the kernel encrypts the counter value to produce
handles, the user-visible sequence of handles does not convey ex-
ploitable information.
The current implementation still has several other storage chan-
nels we intend to close or limit, but we believe these can be mit-
igated without affecting the claims of the paper. In particular, As-
bestos does not yet deal gracefully with certain forms of resource
exhaustion.
9 EVALUATION
The goal of this section is to show that OKWS on Asbestos pro-
vides a useful level of performance. First, we show the amount of
additional memory required to support user isolation in OKWS is
small. We then compare OKWS’s throughput and latency to that
of Apache running on Linux. A prototype OS like Asbestos can
hardly be expected to compete with mature, well-tuned systems
like these. Our experiments nevertheless show OKWS on Asbestos
can already compete with these systems for some scenarios—and
indicate fertile ground for future performance improvements.
The performance measurements were conducted on a gigabit lo-
cal network with a Linux HTTP client generating requests. The
Asbestos server is a 2.8GHz Pentium 4 with 1GB of RAM, but As-
bestos currently only uses 256MB of RAM. Our experiments made
as few ﬁle system accesses as possible; we disabled all Web access
logging and ran all databases in memory.
9.1 Memory use
In Section 6, we argued the merits of event processes over more
traditional fork-accept designs. Our hypothesis was that each addi-
tional protection domain might consume only one additional page
of memory. Our measurements roughly support this claim.
Web sites often cache dynamic data to lighten database load
and to avoid latency. As discussed in Section 7.3, OKWS uses
event processes to cache dynamic data while maintaining isolation
among users. An event process persists over the lifetime of a Web
session, which typically spans multiple HTTP connections. At the
end of an HTTP connection, the worker uses ep clean to release
all memory allocated, except for the session data. A cleaned event
process, with just session data, is called a cached session. An event
process that isprocessing an HTTPrequest uses more memory than
a cached session, since it stores temporary variables and buffers;
such an event process is called an active session. A typical Web
server has many more cached sessions than active ones.
Our experiments measured the amount of allocated memory af-
ter creating different numbers of Web sessions, including space for
kernel data structures. In all of our memory measurements, we ran
OKWS with one toy Web service, which stores data from a user’s
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Figure 6: Memory used by active and cached Web sessions as a func-
tion of the number of sessions. Includes all memory allocated by both
kernel and user programs.
HTTP request and returns it to the user in the subsequent request.
The size of the response is about 1K.
The system uses approximately 1.5 4KB pages per cached ses-
sion, as seen in Figure 6. One complete page is due to state
maintained in the worker’s event process. The remainder of the
memory is for kernel data structures—event processes, labels, and
handles—as well as potentially memory in other user processes,
such as netd. The memory required for kernel data structures is
around twice as much as we expected, probably due to internal
fragmentation or a small memory leak.
To determine the memory cost of active sessions, we repeated
the previous experiment but modiﬁed the worker so that it does not
ever unmap memory, call ep clean or call ep exit. This method
produces worst-case behavior, capturing the maximum amount of
memory consumed by our simple worker. The experiment shows
that an additional eight pages of memory are used by each active
session. Two of those pages are stack and exception stack pages,
one is for the event process’s message queue, and the remaining
ﬁve comprise the modiﬁed heap and pages with modiﬁed global
variables.
9.2 Web server performance
We examined two aspects of Web server performance: through-
put and latency. In these experiments, we tested an even simpler
Web application, which simply responds with a string of charac-
ters whose length depends on the client’s parameters. Wecompared
OKWS on Asbestos to the Apache Web Server, version 1.3.33 [2]
(which outperformed version 2.0.54 in our tests). We implemented
our test application both as a standard CGI process, written in C,
and as an Apache module written in C [1]. In both cases, Apache
keeps a pool of pre-forked processes to answer requests. Apache
with CGI processes additionally forks and executes the CGI binary
for each request. Apache with the module version of the service,
which we call “Mod-Apache”, does not fork for each request. Mod-
Apache is efﬁcient but provides no isolation. Apache withCGI pro-
cesses does provide some isolation, but at a signiﬁcant cost when
compared toMod-Apache, sinceeach request ishandled inaforked
process. However, at least in its default conﬁguration, Apache does
not run CGI processes in a chroot jail, so if the CGI is exploitable,
any vulnerabilities exploitable by a UNIX user on the system are
accessible. In contrast, as discussed previously, OKWS provides
isolation both between services and between users within a service.
9.2.1 Throughput
To test throughput for OKWS relative to Apache and Mod-Apache,
we ﬁrst varied concurrency to maximize completed connections
per second. For Apache, 400 concurrent connections maximized
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Latency ( s)
Server Median 90th Percentile
Mod-Apache 999 1,015
Apache 3,374 5,262
OKWS, 1 session 1,875 2,384
OKWS, 1000 sessions 3,414 6,767
Figure 8: The median and 90th percentile latencies of requests to vari-
ous server conﬁgurations.
performance; for Mod-Apache 16 concurrent connections was the
sweet spot. Asbestos’s network stack is based on LWIP [26], which
was chieﬂy designed to conserve resources and does not offer
good performance under load; sixteen concurrent connections gave
maximum throughput. For OKWS, we then varied the number of
cached sessions in the system. In all tests, the server responded
with 144 bytes of HTTP data, 133 bytes of which were in headers.
Larger responses only exercise the network stack.
Since OKWS isolates users, they were authenticated and run in
different event processes as usual. We measured performance with
the session support described in Section 7.3: once authenticated to
the system, future requests were serviced by the event process cre-
ated in the authentication step. The OKWS throughput results thus
contain data both for forwarding messages to existing event pro-
cesses and for creating new event processes, which is slower—it
involves communication with the database and some kernel over-
head. In our benchmark, for 1000 user sessions and more, each
user connected to its session exactly four times; a workload with
a different ratio of new sessions to existing sessions would per-
form somewhat differently. Because the number of sessions affects
the size of labels on some components, we expect performance to
change with the number of cached sessions. Neither Apache nor
Mod-Apache isolates users, so no attempt to authenticate them is
made in this test.
Figure 7 shows that, with one session, OKWS performs better
than Apache, and a bit over half as well as Mod-Apache. OKWS
performs better than Apache until somewhere over one thousand
sessions are cached in the system, but even with 10,000 separate
event processes, each holding isolated memory state, it performs
approximately half as well as Apache. Section 9.3 further discusses
the factors that reduce OKWS’s performance as sessions increase.
9.2.2 Latency
This section compares the per-request latency of OKWS on As-
bestos with Apache and Mod-Apache. Stuck with low-concurrency
Asbestos, we measured the latency of all three servers with a
concurrency of only four simultaneous connections. Mod-Apache,
which processes each request within a single process, responds to
most requests with very low latency. This is to be expected of a
server that can handle Web requests with simple library calls. Un-
28like Mod-Apache, Apache with CGI pays performance penalties
for forking and IPC, responding to most requests with three to ﬁve
times the latency. As shown in Figure 8, OKWS with one user has a
smaller median latency than Apache, as well as a smaller variance.
Scheduling affects OKWS to a lesser extent because there is no
parallelism for requests to choose from. All requests must sequen-
tially traverse netd, ok-demux, worker, and then netd again, which
doesn’t give the option for any request to be temporarily starved.
OKWS with 1000 cached sessions has latencies which are just a bit
worse then those of Apache.
9.3 Label costs
Ideally, varying the number of sessions should have no effect on
throughput or latency. However, the size of various labels in the
system will increase with the number of sessions. Figure 9 shows
the costs of various components in the system in thousands of CPU
cycles per connection as the number of cached sessions increases.
The OKWS and Network lines represent the time spent in OKWS
and netd code, respectively. The Kernel IPC line includes all time
spent in processing send and recv, which includes most of the sys-
tem’s label operations; time spent in other label operations is in-
cluded as well. The OKDB line represents time spent in the SQLite
database looking up usernames and passwords, and any remaining
processing time is accounted for in the Other line.
With one session in the system, most of the processing time is
in OKWS and the network stack. As the number of sessions in-
creases, database overhead incurred by user authentication quickly
becomes signiﬁcant. This may simply represent another cost of us-
ing unoptimized system components, inthiscase SQLite.However,
label and other kernel IPC operations also take signiﬁcantly more
time as sessions increase. Since OKWS uses two handles to isolate
a user, 10,000 cached sessions implies idd and ok-dbproxy’s send
labels will contain more than 20,000 handles; netd’s receive label
will have accumulated 10,000 declassiﬁcations with respect to taint
handles; and ok-demux will hold at least 10,000 handles for open
worker sessions. Furthermore, some of these large labels must be
updated to include a capability for each new TCP connection, and
then to release that capability when the connection is passed to an
event process or closed. Around 3,000 sessions, time spent doing
IPC and label operations surpasses time spent in the network stack.
By 7,500 sessions, it equals the work being done in all of OKWS.
As expected, linear scaling factors in our label implementation lead
to linear performance degradation as labels increase insize. Further
optimization opportunities are under investigation, as is clearly re-
quired. However, we are pleased that the degradation is relatively
mild, with no obviously quadratic or exponential factors. As we
hypothesized, Asbestos labels and event processes make it practi-
cal to isolate user state even on a server storing data for thousands
of users.
10 CONCLUSION
TheAsbestosoperating systemmakesnondiscretionary accesscon-
trol mechanisms available to unprivileged users, giving them ﬁne-
grained, end-to-end control over the dissemination of informa-
tion. Asbestos provides protection through a new labeling scheme,
which, unlike schemes in previous operating systems, allows data
to be sanitized or declassiﬁed by individual users within categories
they control. The categories, called handles, use the same names as
communication endpoints, making them a kind of generalization of
capabilities. As in a capability system, processes can dynamically
generate new handles and distribute them independently, and pro-
cesses can specify temporary label restrictions on sent messages to
avoid the unintentional use of privilege.
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Figure 9: The average cost in Kcycles/connection of various Asbestos
components, as the number of cached sessions increases.
Asbestos also introduces a new process abstraction, event pro-
cesses, which allow a server process to inhabit disjoint security
compartments without either privilegeor contamination. Event pro-
cesses impose less overhead on the operating system than forked
address spaces, so many thousands of them can theoretically coex-
ist without resource strain. A prototype Web server manipulates la-
beled data so that even software bugs in the high-risk worker code
cannot cause one user to receive another’s private data. The sys-
tem requires only 1.5 pages of memory per cached Web session
and exhibits performance comparable to Unix systems that provide
weaker isolation.
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